Historiographical Concepts

Historiographical Concepts

Wangdao 王道 (‘The Way of the King’) and Badao 霸道 (‘The Way of the Hegemon’)

1. Etymology

The term wangdao 王道 (‘Way of the King,’ ‘Kingly Way,’ ‘Royal Way’) is frequently attested in Zhou-era texts of various schools of thought discussing notions of ideal government and ideal society. In particular, it was a reference to the idealized rulers of the Xia 夏朝 (c. 2000-1600 BCE), Shang商朝 (c. 1500-1045 BCE), and early Zhou 周朝 (c. 1045-256 BCE) periods, deemed to have been impartial and just. The locus classicus in the Book of Documents defines the Way of the King as such:

Without deflection, without unevenness, pursue the royal righteousness. Without selfish likings, pursue the royal way. Without selfish dislikings, pursue the royal path. Avoid deflection, avoid partiality; broad and long is the royal way. Avoid partiality, avoid deflection; level and easy is the royal way. Avoid perversity, avoid one-sidedness; correct and straight is the royal way. (Ever) seek for this perfect excellence, (ever) turn to this perfect excellence.[1]

無偏無陂，遵王之義；無有作好，遵王之道；無有作惡，尊王之路。無偏無黨，王道蕩蕩；無黨無偏，王道平平；無反無側，王道正直。會其有極，歸其有極。

From this narrow meaning referring to the ruler himself Confucianism derived a broader meaning referring to the society as a whole.  If the ruler abided by the wangdao; the society as a whole would too; in this sense  the wangdao became the ‘Way that should be king (in society).’ In the writings of the Confucian scholar Mencius, its meaning is defined as ‘this condition, in which the people nourish their living and bury their dead without any feeling against any, is the first step of royal government.’

Hence, juxtaposed to the decadent ways of the present, wangdao  became a normative postulate for ideal rulers and, in broader terms,  society.  Mencius—and other thinkers of antiquity—juxtaposed the morally perfected ‘king’ (wang) to the objectionable ‘hegemon’ (ba), i.e. a ruler who governs by his might and violence rather than by his moral stewardship.  Thus, the conceptual opposite of the ideal ‘royal way’ (wangdao) was the notion of badao 霸道 (‘Way of the Hegemon’).

 

2. Conceptual history

Both terms—wangdao and badao—have been in continuous use throughout China’s imperial period.  Beyond China, they have played important roles in political discourses in the various polities of Korea,[2] Japan,[3] and Vietnam.[4]  By the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century, the concept came to be adapted to the challenges posed by the encounter with the West.  It has been—essentially up to the present day—used in two main domains.  In domestic politics, it has come to be adapted to constitutional and parliamentary discourses across East Asia.  ‘Constitutionalism’ is less a fixed ideology but a discursive vessel which can be variously filled with a variety of political ideas according to the political preferences of its proponents, and combined and justified with elements of local traditions of political philosophy, including the ‘kingly way.’  On an international level, it has been proposed as a guiding principle of international relations, often as a counter-concept to Westphalian international public law.  In this sense, it was closely connected to the various strains of Pan-Asianist thought.[5]  In this context, Western imperialism was cast as a ‘rule of might’ (badao), with which the morally superior Asian ‘rule of right’ (wangdao) was juxtaposed.  Additionally, wangdao was also applied to economic questions, in particular labour relations, hoping that it may solve the contradiction between labour and capital.[6]

Confucianism gained significant influence in early modern Japanese intellectual debates.  In particular, scholars of the ‘Classical Studies’ (kogaku 古學) school like Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 (1627–1705) and Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠 (1666–1728) foregrounded the ‘kingly way (J. ōdō) in their political theories.’[7] Against this background, the ‘kingly way’ became visible as an important discursive element of the Meiji-era constitution–making process of the 1870s and 1880s.  For example, the Japanese military commander Torio Koyata 鳥尾小弥太 (1848–1905) harnessed it to oppose the liberal tide on the one hand and the despotism of the ruling oligarchy on the other.[8]   Torio combined his Confucian ideas with Buddhist ones, defining ‘natural law’ as the karmic cause and effect of Buddhist law combined with the Confucian social relations as embodied by the ‘kingly way.’[9] In the Taishō (1912–1925) era, the ‘kingly way’ continued to be seen as a goal of authoritarian political reforms designed to overcome what intellectuals saw as the corrupt party politics and the societal divisions of the time.  Although their aspirations were part of a global authoritarian turn, they presented the concept as an alternative to the decadent ways of Europe, including fascism and socialism.  This conception of ‘kingly way’ saw the emperor as the embodiment of the Japanese ‘national body’ (kokutai, C. guoti 國體), who should be ‘assisted’ in his rule by a popular representation organically unifying the ‘will of the people’ (min’i, C. minyi 民意).

Originally an opposition discourse, proponents of this formula rose to power in Japan in the 1930s, accompanying Japan’s authoritarian turn.[10] In the meantime, Chinese politicians had crafted their own versions of wangdao. Late Qing officials used it to criticize imperialist truculence,[11] and the leading late Qing thinker Kang Youwei 康有爲 (1858–1927) advocated it as a standard for good governance by an emperor who should ‘punish evil and reward good.’[12] The revolutionist and provisional president of the Republic of China, Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866–1925), adduced the concept of the ‘kingly way’ to explain ‘nationalism’ (minzu zhuyi 民族主義), the first of his ‘Three Principles of the People’ (san min zhuyi 三民主義) which constituted the basic ideology of the Republic of China.  To Sun, while states were violently formed through the ‘way of the hegemon,’ nations were units naturally formed through the ‘kingly way.’[13]  Accordingly, the United Kingdom was a state held together by sheer violence, while China had grown organically and in harmony.  Such views came to be widely espoused in defense of Kuomintang rule between the 1920s and 1940s.[14]

Such interpretations were easily and widely applied to international relations, especially to the encroachment by imperialist powers.  Early in the 20th century, the Vietnamese scholar Đặng Văn Thụy 鄧文瑞 (1858–1936), for example, denounced French colonial rule as an example of despotic badao (V. bá đạo) as opposed to the just wangdao (V. vương đạo) in the Mencian sense.[15]  Similarly, Sun Yat-sen, in his speech on Pan-Asianism given in 1924, juxtaposed Asian cultures, which he classified as belonging to the ‘kingly way,’ with the materialistic and violent Western ‘way of the hegemon’:

Such a civilization, when applied to society, will mean the cult of force, with aeroplanes, bombs, and cannons as its outstanding features. Recently, this cult of force has been repeatedly employed by the Western peoples to oppress Asia, and as a consequence, there is no progress in Asia. To oppress others with the cult of force, in the language of the Ancients, is the rule of Might. Therefore, European civilization is nothing but the rule of Might. The rule of Might has always been looked down upon by the Orient. There is another kind of civilization superior to the rule of Might. The fundamental characteristics of this civilization are benevolence, justice and morality: This civilization makes people respect, not fear, it. Such a civilization is, in the language of the Ancients, the rule of Right or the Kingly Way. One may say, therefore, that Oriental civilization is one of the rule of Right. Since the development of European materialistic civilization and the cult of Might, the morality of the world has been on the decline. Even in Asia, morality in several countries has degenerated. Of late, a number of European and American scholars have begun to study Oriental civilization and they realize that, while materially the Orient is far behind the Occident, morally the Orient is superior to the Occident.[16]

這種文化應用到人類社會，只見物質文明，只有飛機炸彈，只有洋槍大砲，專是一種武力的文化。歐洲人近有專用這種武力的文化來壓迫我們亞洲，所以我們亞洲便不能進步。這種專用武力壓迫人的文化，用我們中國的古話說就是「行霸道」，所以歐洲的文化是霸道的文化。但是我們東洋向來輕視霸道的文化。還有一種文化，好過霸道的文化，這種文化的本質，是仁義道德。用這種仁義道德的文化，是感化人，不是壓迫人；是要人懷德，不是要人畏威。這種要人懷德的文化，我們中國的古話就說是「行王道」。所以亞洲的文化，就是王道的文化。自歐洲的物質文明發達，霸道大行之後，世界各國的道德，便天天退步。就是亞洲，也有好幾個國家的道德，也是很退步。近來歐美學者為留心東洋文化，也漸漸知道東洋的物質文明，雖然不如西方，但是東洋的道德，便比西方高得多。

Sun’s conception of wangdao was an indictment of Western imperialism and a call for Pan-Asian self-defense.[17]  At the same time, it betrayed a certain Sinocentric bias and could be read as a claim for China’s ‘benevolent overlordship over its lesser neighbours.’[18]  Held in Kobe, the speech found much attention among Japanese intellectuals.  However, when wangdao was used by Japanese intellectuals and politicians in the realm of international relations, its thrust was reversed.  Wangdao came to be marshalled for the sake of Japanese overlordship over other Asian polities, namely in the Empire of Manchuria (Manchukuo) set up in 1932 after the invasion of Manchuria by Japan.[19]

Wangdao thinking in Manchuria was an eclectic mix of various sources, both Chinese and Japanese.  The officers who spearheaded the invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931, among them Ishiwara Kanji 石原莞爾 (1889–1940), were ardent supporters of the Japanese version of the concept, while  Qing loyalists who dreamt of going back to the glory of Confucian monarchy made up a significant part of Manchukuo’s Chinese elite. [20]  Zheng Xiaoxu 鄭孝胥 (1860–1938), the prime minister of Manchukuo, laid out his visions in a work published in 1934 and titled A Glimpse of the Kingly Way (Wangdao guankui 王道管窺).  For Zheng, the ‘kingly way’ was a by-product of the ‘open door policy’ of economic openness, which had been first proposed for China by the United States in the late 19th century.[21] International supervision, in that case by Japan, was a means to overcome China’s internal chaos and strife, leading to ‘universal love’ (bo’ai 博愛).[22] In the following years, wangdao became the central element of the state ideology of the newly formed state.  With an emphasis on ethnic harmony between the ‘five races’ of the state (Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Manchu, and Mongol), Manchukuo was portrayed in propaganda as the ‘paradise of the Kingly Way’ (wangdao letu 王道樂土).  More than that, the ‘kingly way’ was not only seen as a local ideology, but was meant to be a model with fundamental, even universal validity.  As a propaganda poster expressed it: ‘The light of the Kingly Way illuminates the whole globe’ (wangdao zhi guang puzhao quanqiu 王道之光普照全球).[23]

After the end of the Second World War, the concept of wangdao was only sparsely used across East Asia.  However, it has seen a remarkable revival in discourses about the legitimation of statecraft as well as international relations after the death of Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976) and the initiation of the ‘Reform and Opening’ policies in the late 1970s.  It has featured in discourse supporting the current government of the PRC; liberal-democratic discourse; and alternative proposals centered around the idea of a distinct ‘Confucian Constitutionalism’ (ruxue xianzheng 儒學憲政) designed to be an alternative to both orthodox Marxism-Leninism and Western liberal constitutionalism.  Similarly, the notion of a ‘kingly way’ has also occasionally featured in recent Vietnamese discourses on the country’s socialist government.[24]

The earliest and most detailed proposals for a Confucian reform of society came are those of Jiang Qing 蔣慶 (1953–). Under the impression of the collapse of the ideological certainties of the Mao era and the violent suppression of the democracy movement, Jiang first proposed a ‘revival of Confucianism’ (fuxing ruxue 復興儒學) as a means to save Chinese society in 1989.[25] Jiang set up his own Confucian Academy (Yangming jingshe 陽明精舍) in the mountains of Guizhou in 1996 and has prolifically written about the topic.  Jiang’s proposal for a ‘Constitutional Confucianism’ advocates for a tricameral parliament consisting of a House of the Ru 儒 (Confucian scholars), the ‘House of the Nation’ consisting of various notables within society, and a popularly elected ‘House of the People.’[26]  In his words,

The way ahead for China’s political development is the Way of the Humane Authority and not democracy. This is the only way in which Chinese culture can respond to the challenge of Western culture. However, in recent years China’s political development has begun to go astray. Every current of political thought in China assumes that democracy is the way ahead for China. This goes without saying for liberal democracy’s Western-style “genuine democracy,” or for the pursuit of a “socialist democracy” by socialism that is supposed to differ from “capitalist democracy.” It even includes the neo-Confucians who exalt Chinese culture and make democracy the “new kingship” derived from the Confucian way of the sage. A glance over China’s current world of thought shows that Chinese people have already lost their ability to think independently about political questions. In other words, Chinese people are no longer able to use patterns of thought inherent in their own culture—Chinese culture—to think about China’s current political development. This is a great tragedy for the world of Chinese thought! It is, therefore, necessary to go back to the inherent patterns of Chinese culture to ground the development of Chinese political thought, rather than simply following the Western trends and forgetting our own culture. By the “inherent pattern of Chinese culture” I refer to the “politics of the Way of the Humane Authority.” The politics of the Way of the Humane Authority is the way ahead for China.

中國政治的發展方向是王道而不是民主，這是中國文化回應西方文化挑戰的應有之義。但是，近代以來，中國政治發展的方向出現了偏差，即中國所有的政治思潮都把民主作爲中國政治的發展方向。自由主義標榜西式的「真正民主」自不用說，社會主義追求的是區別於 「資本主義民主」的「社會主義民主」，就連以弘揚中國文化爲己任的新儒家，爲把民主作爲應有儒家内聖心性之學開出的「新外王」。換股當今中國的思想界，中國人已經喪失了獨立思考政治問題的能力；也即是說，中國人已經不能按照自己文化（中國文化）的内在理路來思考當今中國政治發展的問題了。這是當今中國思想界的最大悲劇！鑒於此，在思考當今中國的政治問題時，必須回到中國文化的内在理路來確立中國政治的發展方向，不能追隨西方的政治潮流而捨己從人。這裏所謂「中國文化的内在理路」就是「王道」，「王道」就是當今中國政治的發展方向。[27]

Many other intellectuals have developed competing interpretations of what wangdao could mean in contemporary China, offering visions that try to adapt wangdao to modernity. For example, Gan Chunsong 幹春松 (1965–) rejects nationalistic and ethnocentric readings of wangdao, attempting to transform it into a more inclusive concept for a global age. While classical texts conceive of a ‘transformative education’ (jiaohua 教化) of peoples in the periphery by the Chinese centre, Gan contends that the pursuit for cultural superiority through the ‘kingly way’ does not compromise equality between the peoples.[28] Chen Ming 陳明 (1962–) sees the ‘kingly way’ as a central element of a Confucianism which he envisions as a ‘civil religion’ that would underpin a liberal and democratic China.[29]

The Chinese government itself has come to claim the rule of the Communist Party of China as a form of a ‘kingly way,’ with an increasingly authoritarian impetus.[30] Again, the concept is thought to have a universal rather than merely local significance. Since Xi’s tenure, the notion of the ‘kingly way’ has been connected to his slogan of a ‘community of shared destiny for mankind’ (renlei mingyun gongtongti 人類命運共同體). At a speech in Geneva in 2017 titled ‘Towards a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,’ Xi Jinping 習近平 (1953–) invoked the concept when discussing international law. The official English version of his speech translated the relevant passage of the Book of Documents as ‘genuine equality and justice in the world.’[31] Hence, the ‘kingly way’ has become, if not always a suggestion for global governance, at least a sign of increased Chinese assertiveness on the global stage about China’s own political system.

Although most New Confucian intellectuals have adhered to the top-down approach towards Confucianism espoused by the official Party line, there are still more liberal understandings of wangdao, such as that of Chen Ming, who has continued to emphatically embrace liberal constitutionalism.[32] The most vocal critic of the official use of wangdao is Xu Zhangrun 許章潤 (1962–), a professor of constitutional law at Tsinghua 清華 University in Beijing. Xu, who was dismissed from his professorship in 2020, denied that the current government is one of the ‘kingly way’ and warns of ‘an arrogant totalitarianism’ that ‘may once more hold haughty sway, it is an enterprise built on shifting sands.’ [33] In spite of the narrowing space for intellectual discourse, thus, the concept of the ‘kingly way’ remains contested in contemporary China.

 

 

[1] Shujing 書經 [Book of Documents], Zhoushu 周書 [Book of Zhou], chapter ‘Hongfan’ 洪範 [Great Plan]. Translation according to James Legge, The Chinese Classics with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes: Vol. III, Part. II, Containing the Fifth Part of the Shoo King, or the Books of Chow; and the Indexes (London: Trübner, & Co., 1865), 331–2.

[2] Kim Hong-baek 김홍백, ‘Chosŏn chisŏngsaesŏŭi wangdo wa p’aedo tamnon’ 조선 지성사에서의 王道와 覇道 담론 [The discourse on the ‘way of the king’ and the ‘way of the hegemon’ in Chosŏn intellectual history], Kojŏn munhak yŏn’gu 古典文學研究 60 (2021): 249–311.

[3] Noguchi Takehiko, 野口武彦, ‘Ōdō to kakumei no aida: Edo Shushi-gaku ni okeru “Mōshi” jūyō no Mondai’ 王道と革命の間–江戸朱子学における「孟子」受容の問題 [Between the ‘kingly way’ and revolution: Problems of the reception of ‘Mencius’ in Edo-era Zhu Xi scholarship], Bungaku 文学 44, no. 7 (1976): 945-61.

[4] Phạm Thị Lan, ‘Vai trò xã hội của nho giáo ở Việt Nam từ thế kỷ thứ XV đến nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX’ [The social role of Confucianism in Vietnam from the 15th century to the first half of the 19th century] (Phd diss.: Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, 2017).

[5] Sven Saaler, and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History. 2 vols. (Lanham, &c. Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

[6] Kiri Paramore, Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 154–5.

[7] Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將, Riben Dechuan jidao guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhi lun: Yi Yiteng Renzhai, Disheng Culai wei zhongxin 日本德川時代古學派之王道政治論：以伊藤仁齋、荻生徂徠為中心 [The political theory of the ‘kingly way’ in the Classical Studies school of Tokugawa-era Japan: Centering on Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai] (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue chuban zhongxin, 2004).

[8] Bruce Grover, ‘Public opinion under imperial benevolence: Japanese “national essence” leader Torio Koyata’s anti-liberal parliamentarianism in the Genrō-in and the House of Lords,’ in Planting Parliaments in Eurasia: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies, 1850–1950, ed. Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 75–102.

[9] Ibid., 85.

[10] Bruce Grover and Egas Moniz Bandeira, ‘Aspirations for a mass political party in prewar imperial Japan: Bureaucracy, the reformist right, and the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association,’ in Parties and Governments in Europe: Nationalism, Socialism, and Development (1913–1991), ed. Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira (Abingdon: Routledge, 2022); Shaun O’Dwyer, Confucianism’s Prospects: A Reassessment (New York: State University of New York Press, 2020), 152–56.

[11] Tao Tian, ‘Chinese Intellectuals’ Discourse of International Law in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,’ in Morality and Responsibility of Rulers: European and Chinese Origins of a Rule of Law as Justice for World Order, ed. Anthony Carty and Janne Nijman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 344–45.

[12] Peter Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 33–37.

[13] Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, ‘Minzuzhuyi: Di yi jiang’ 民族主義：第一講 [Nationalism: First speech], in Guofu quanji 國父全集 [Complete works of the father of the nation], 12 vols, Qin Xiaoyi 奏孝儀 and Guofu quanji bianji weiyuanhui 國父全集編輯委員會, eds (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989), 1:4.

[14] See Marc Matten, Imagining a Postnational World: Hegemony and Space in Modern China (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 225–40.

[15] Wynn Gadkar-Wilcox, ‘Universality, Modernity, and Cultural Borrowing among Vietnamese Intellectuals, 1877–1919,’ Journal of Transcultural Studies 9, no. 1–2 (2018): 33–52.

[16] Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, ‘Da Yazhou zhuyi’ 大亞洲主義 [Pan-Asianism], in Guofu quanji 國父全集 [Complete works of the father of the nation], 12 vols., Qin Xiaoyi 奏孝儀 and Guofu quanji bianji weiyuanhui 國父全集編輯委員會, eds. (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989), 3:538–9.

[17] Zhiyi Yang, ‘Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism, Pan-Asianism: The Weakness Discourse and Wang Jingwei’s Intellectual Transformation.’ In Discourses of Weakness in Modern China: Historical Diagnoses of the “Sick Man of East Asia,” ed. Iwo Amelung (Frankfurt: Campus, 2020).

[18] Liu Xiaoyuan, ‘China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War,’ Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (1999): 448.

[19] Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity. Manchukuo and the East Asia Modern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 101–2.

[20] Lin Chih Hung 林志宏, ‘Wangdao letu: Qing yimin de qinggan dizhi han canyu “Manzhouguo” ’ 王道樂土——清遺民的情感抵制和參與「滿洲國」[Dreamland of the Kingly Way: Emotional Resistance and the Participation of Qing Loyalists in Manchukuo], Xin shixue 新史學 18, no. 3 (2007): 45–100.

[21] Yuan Jianda, ‘ “Communism Destroys Republicanism, and International Supervision Destroys Communism”: Manchukuo’s First Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu and His Dreams of the Open Door and the Kingly Way.’ American Journal of Chinese Studies 27, no. 2 (2020): 113-38.

[22] Ibid., 117.

[23] See Kishi Toshihiko貴志俊彦, Manshūkoku no bijuaru media: posutā, ehagaki, kitte 満洲国のビジュアル・メディア：ポスター・絵はがき・切手 [The visual media of Manchukuo: Poster, postcards, stamps] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2010), 102.

[24] Đỗ Minh Đức and Nguyễn Thủy Văn, ‘Học thuyết đức trị và vấn đề xây dựng nhà nước pháp quyền xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam’ [Ethic political theory and construction of Vietnam’s rule of law], Tạp chí Khoa học ĐHQGHN: Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn 31, no. 1 (2015): 52–58.

[25] Jun Deng and Craig A. Smith, ‘The rise of New Confucianism and the return of spirituality to politics in mainland China,’ China Information 32, no. 2 (2018): 299.

[26] Jiang Qing 蔣慶, Zailun zhengzhi ruxue 再論政治儒學 [Political Confucianism Revisited] (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue chubanshe, 2011).

[27] Jiang Qing 蔣慶, ‘Wangdao zhengzhi yu dangjin Zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhan fangxiang’ 王道政治與當今中國政治的發展方向 [The politics of the Way of the Humane Authority and the way ahead for China], in Dangdai ruxue de fazhan fangxiang: Dangdai ruxue guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 當代儒學的發展方向：當代儒學國際學術研討會論文集 [The way ahead for contemporary Confucianism: Proceedings of the international academic conference on contemporary Confucianism], ed. Wu Guang 吳光(Shanghai: Gezhi chubanshe, 2005), 69. English translation according to Jiang Qing, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future, trans. Edmund Ryden, ed. Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 27. The footnotes present in the translation have not been included here.

[28] Gan Chunsong 幹春松, Chonghui wangdao: Rujia yu shijie zhixu 重回王道—儒家與世界秩序 [Back to Wangdao: Confucianism and the World Order] (Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue chubanshe, 2012), reviewed by David Elstein, Dao 12, no. 3 (2013): 399–401.

[29] Chen Ming 陳明, Ruzhe zhi wei 儒者之維 [The Confucian’s dimension] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2004). On Confucianism as a civil religion see further Bart Dessein, ‘Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion.’ Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2014): 39–64.

[30] Dongxian Jiang and Shaun O’Dwyer, ‘Universalizing “Kingly Way” Confucianism: A Japanese Legacy and Chinese Future?’ in Handbook of Confucianism in Modern Japan, ed. Shaun O’Dwyer (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022), 184-202.

[31] Xi Jinping 习近平, ‘Gongtong goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti (2018 nian 1 yue 18 ri)’ 共同构建人类命运共同体 （2017年 1月 18日）, in Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng 习近平谈治国理政 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), 2:540. English translation as ‘Towards a Community of Shared Future for Mankind (January 18, 2017),’ in The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), 2:591.

[32] David Ownby, ‘Introduction’ to Chen Ming, ‘The Road to Confucian Civil Religion,’ transl. and intr. David Ownby, Reading the China Dream, accessed January 20, 2023, https://www.readingthechinadream.com/chen-ming-confucian-civil-religion.html.

[33] Xu Zhangrun 許章潤, ‘Zhi houmen xia zhusheng’ 致候門下諸生 [To my students], in Gengzi shi zha 庚子十劄 [Ten letters from a year of plague] (New York: Bouden House, 2021), 58. English translation as ‘A farewell to my students, an Excerpt from “Ten Letters from a Plague Year,” by Xu Zhangrun,’ transl. and annotated Geremie R. Barmé, China File, accessed January 20, 2023, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/farewell-my-students.

 

3. Sources/Literature

There are available (partial) translations of a number of New Confucian thinkers, including Jiang Qing (at Princeton University Press) and Chen Ming (on the website Reading the China Dream, www.readingthechinadream.com). Publications of Xu Zhangrun’s writings are published by his translator Geremie Barmé in China File (www.chinafile.com). Official translations of Xi Jinping’s speeches have been published in the collection The Governance of China, which has been translated into a large number of languages, including English.

 

Chen Ming 陳明. Ruzhe zhi wei 儒者之維 [The Confucian’s dimension]. Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2004.

Deng, Jun, and Craig A. Smith. ‘The rise of New Confucianism and the return of spirituality to politics in mainland China.’ China Information 32, no. 2 (2018): 294–314.

Dessein, Bart. ‘Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion.’ Asian Studies 2, no. 1 (2014): 39–64.

Đỗ Minh Đức and Nguyễn Thủy Văn. ‘Học thuyết đức trị và vấn đề xây dựng nhà nước pháp quyền xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam’ [Ethic Political Theory and Construction of Vietnam’s Rule of Law]. Tạp chí Khoa học ĐHQGHN: Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn 31, no. 1 (2015): 52–58.

Duara, Prasenjit. Sovereignty and Authenticity. Manchukuo and the East Asia Modern. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Elstein, David. ‘Review of Chonghui wangdao: Rujia yu shijie zhixu 重回王道—儒家與世界秩序 [Back to Wangdao: Confucianism and the World Order], by Gan Chunsong.’ Dao 12, no. 3 (2013): 399–401.

Gadkar-Wilcox, Wynn. ‘Universality, Modernity, and Cultural Borrowing among Vietnamese Intellectuals, 1877–1919.’ Journal of Transcultural Studies 9, no. 1–2 (2018): 33–52.

Gan Chunsong 幹春松. Chonghui wangdao: Rujia yu shijie zhixu 重回王道—儒家與世界秩序 [Back to Wangdao: Confucianism and the World Order]. Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue chubanshe, 2012.

Grover, Bruce. ‘Public opinion under imperial benevolence: Japanese “national essence” leader Torio Koyata’s anti-liberal parliamentarianism in the Genrō-in and the House of Lords.’ In Planting Parliaments in Eurasia: Concepts, Practices, and Mythologies, 1850–1950 edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 75–102. Abingdon: Routledge, 2021.

Grover, Bruce, and Egas Moniz Bandeira, ‘Aspirations for a mass political party in prewar imperial Japan: Bureaucracy, the reformist right, and the creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.’ In Parties as Governments in Europe: Nationalism, Socialism, and Development (1913–1991), edited by Ivan Sablin and Egas Moniz Bandeira, 151–77. Abingdon: Routledge, 2022.

Jiang, Dongxian and Shaun O’Dwyer. ‘Universalizing “Kingly Way” Confucianism: A Japanese Legacy and Chinese Future?’ In Handbook of Confucianism in Modern Japan, edited by Shaun O’Dwyer, 184-202. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2022.

Jiang Qing 蔣慶. ‘Wangdao zhengzhi yu dangjin Zhongguo zhengzhi de fazhan fangxiang’ 王道政治與當今中國政治的發展方向 [The politics of the Way of the Humane Authority and the way ahead for China]. In Dangdai ruxue de fazhan fangxiang: Dangdai ruxue guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 當代儒學的發展方向：當代儒學國際學術研討會論文集 [The way ahead for contemporary Confucianism: Proceedings of the international academic conference on contemporary Confucianism], edited by Wu Guang 吳光, 69–83. Shanghai: Gezhi chubanshe, 2005.

Jiang Qing 蔣慶. Zailun zhengzhi ruxue 再論政治儒學 [Political Confucianism Revisited]. Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue chubanshe, 2011.

Jiang Qing. A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future. Translated by Edmund Ryden. Edited by Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Kim Hong-baek 김홍백. ‘Chosŏn chisŏngsaesŏŭi wangdo wa p’aedo tamnon’ 조선 지성사에서의 王道와 覇道 담론 [The discourse on the ‘way of the king’ and the ‘way of the hegemon’ in Chosŏn intellectual history]. Kojŏn munhak yŏn’gu 古典文學研究 60 (2021): 249–311.

Kishi Toshihiko貴志俊彦. Manshūkoku no bijuaru media: posutā, ehagaki, kitte 満洲国のビジュアル・メディア：ポスター・絵はがき・切手 [The visual media of Manchukuo: Poster, postcards, stamps]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2010.

Legge, James. The Chinese Classics with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes: Vol. III, Part. II, Containing the Fifth Part of the Shoo King, or the Books of Chow; and the Indexes. London: Trübner, & Co., 1865.

Lin Chih Hung 林志宏. ‘Wangdao letu: Qing yimin de qinggan dizhi han canyu “Manzhouguo” ’ 王道樂土——清遺民的情感抵制和參與「滿洲國」[Dreamland of the Kingly Way: Emotional Resistance and the Participation of Qing Loyalists in Manchukuo]. Xin shixue 新史學 18, no. 3 (2007): 45–100.

Liu Xiaoyuan. ‘China and the Issue of Postwar Indochina in the Second World War.’ Modern Asian Studies 33, no. 2 (1999): 445–82.

Matten, Marc Andre. Imagining a Postnational World: Hegemony and Space in Modern China. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

Noguchi Takehiko, 野口武彦, ‘Ōdō to kakumei no aida: Edo Shushi-gaku ni okeru “Mōshi” jūyō no Mondai’ 王道と革命の間–江戸朱子学における「孟子」受容の問題 [Between the ‘kingly way’ and revolution: Problems of the reception of ‘Mencius’ in Edo-era Zhu Xi scholarship]. Bungaku 文学 44, no. 7 (1976): 945-61.

O’Dwyer, Shaun. Confucianism’s Prospects: A Reassessment. New York: State University of New York Press, 2020.

Paramore, Kiri. Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Phạm Thị Lan, ‘Vai trò xã hội của nho giáo ở Việt Nam từ thế kỷ thứ XV đến nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX’ [The social role of Confucianism in Vietnam from the 15th century to the first half of the 19th century]. Phd diss.: Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences, 2017.

Saaler, Sven, and Christopher W. A. Szpilman, eds. Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History. 2 vols. Lanham et al.:. Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙. ‘Da Yazhou zhuyi’ 大亞洲主義 [Pan-Asianism]. In Guofu quanji 國父全集 [Complete works of the father of the nation], edited by Qin Xiaoyi 奏孝儀 and Guofu quanji bianji weiyuanhui 國父全集編輯委員會, 3:535–42. 12 vols. Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989.

———. ‘Minzuzhuyi: Di yi jiang’ 民族主義：第一講 [Nationalism: First speech]. In Guofu quanji 國父全集 [Complete works of the father of the nation], edited by Qin Xiaoyi 奏孝儀 and Guofu quanji bianji weiyuanhui 國父全集編輯委員會, 1:3–12. 12 vols. Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1989.

Tao Tian. ‘Chinese Intellectuals’ Discourse of International Law in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.’ In Morality and Responsibility of Rulers: European and Chinese Origins of a Rule of Law as Justice for World Order, edited by Anthony Carty and Janne Nijman, 339-359. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Xi Jinping 习近平. ‘Gongtong goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti (2018 nian 1 yue 18 ri)’ 共同构建人类命运共同体 （2017年 1月 18日）. In Xi Jinping tan zhiguo lizheng 习近平谈治国理政, 2:537–48. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017. English translation as ‘Towards a Community of Shared Future for Mankind (January 18, 2017).’ In The Governance of China, 2:588–601. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017.

Xu Zhangrun 許章潤. ‘Zhi houmen xia zhusheng’ 致候門下諸生 [To my students]. In Gengzi shi zha 庚子十劄 [Ten letters from a year of plague], 57–77. New York: Bouden House, 2021. English translation as ‘A farewell to my students, an Excerpt from “Ten Letters from a Plague Year,” by Xu Zhangrun,’ translated and annotated by Geremie R. Barmé. China File. Accessed January 20, 2023. https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/farewell-my-students.

Yang, Zhiyi. ‘Nationalism, Human-Co-Existentialism, Pan-Asianism: The Weakness Discourse and Wang Jingwei’s Intellectual Transformation.’ In Discourses of Weakness in Modern China: Historical Diagnoses of the “Sick Man of East Asia,” edited by Iwo Amelung. Frankfurt: Campus, 2020.

Yuan Jianda, ‘ “Communism Destroys Republicanism, and International Supervision Destroys Communism”: Manchukuo’s First Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu and His Dreams of the Open Door and the Kingly Way.’ American Journal of Chinese Studies 27, no. 2 (2020): 113-38.

Zarrow, Peter. After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1885-1924. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Zhang Kunjiang 張崑將. Riben Dechuan jidao guxuepai zhi wangdao zhengzhi lun: Yi Yiteng Renzhai, Disheng Culai wei zhongxin 日本德川時代古學派之王道政治論：以伊藤仁齋、荻生徂徠為中心 [The political theory of the ‘kingly way’ in the Classical Studies school of Tokugawa-era Japan: Centering on Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai]. Taipei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue chuban zhongxin, 2004.